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Alexander Swoboda is one of the originators of the bipolar view that capital mobility creates pressure
for countries to abandon intermediate exchange rate arrangements in favor of greater flexibility and
harder pegs.  This paper takes another look at the evidence for this hypothesis using two popular de
facto classifications of exchange rate regimes.  That evidence supports the bipolar view for the advanced
countries, the sample for which it was originally developed, but not obviously for emerging markets
and other developing countries.  One interpretation of the contrast is that there is a tendency to move
away from intermediate regimes in the course of economic and financial development, implying that
emerging markets and other developing countries will eventually abandon intermediate regimes as
well.  Another interpretation is that the advanced countries have been faster to abandon soft pegs because
they have been faster to develop attractive alternatives, notably Europe's monetary union.  In this view,
other countries are unlikely to abandon soft pegs because of the absence of the distinctive political
conditions that have made the European alternative feasible.  A final interpretation is that the advanced
countries have been able to abandon soft peg because of their success in substituting inflation targeting
for exchange rate targeting as the anchor for monetary policy.  The paper presents some evidence for
this view, which suggests the feasibility of further movement by emerging markets and developing
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1.  Introduction 
  Alexander Swoboda is recognized for many important contributions to exchange 
rate economics.  One of the less known is the fact that he is the father (grandfather? 
godfather?) of the bipolar view – that is, of the idea that capital mobility creates pressure 
for countries to abandon intermediate exchange rate arrangements in favor of greater 
flexibility and harder pegs.  Looking back on his contributions to this literature (Swoboda 
1986, Genberg and Swoboda 1987a, b), it is hard to know whether to group him with the 
hawks or doves.
2  The hawks argue that international capital mobility fatally undermines 
the viability of intermediate regimes.  It makes it more difficult to maintain both 
monetary independence and an exchange rate target.  Insofar as monetary independence 
has value, the result is adoption of a more flexible exchange rate.  And insofar as the 
stability offered by an exchange rate target has value, the result is a tendency to seek 
monetary unification with like-minded partners.   
While the doves acknowledge that that capital mobility complicates the operation 
of intermediate arrangements, they resist the conclusion that it creates irresistible pressure 
to move to the poles.  As in other economic settings where agents trade off two objectives, 
                                                 
1 Prepared for the conference in honor of Alexander Swoboda, Geneva, 30 May 2008.  Thanks to Inci 
Otker-Robe and Harald Anderson for data and to Raul Razo-Garcia for help with the calculations.  Sections 
2 and 3 are an update and extension of Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006).  I thank Raul Razo-Garcia for 
his input into the larger project of which this paper is part. 
2 A number of others have laid claim to this theory or discovered it independently, such as Crockett (1994) 
and Eichengreen (1994).  But Swoboda came first.   2
an interior solution may be optimal.  In the present context this means striving for a 
degree of monetary independence that is less than complete and a degree of exchange rate 
stability that is less than perfect.  This interior solution will be characterized by managed 
flexibility.  The exchange rate will have to be more flexible than when capital mobility is 
absent, in which case it is possible to have monetary independence without 
compromising currency stability, but free flexibility is not required.  The middle may 
have to be defined more liberally – in addition to pegged but adjustable rates and narrow 
bands it now must include managed floats and wide bands.  Subject to this caveat, 
however, capital mobility does not imply the need to abandon intermediate regimes.  
It is unlikely that one more paper will produce a consensus on these contested 
issues, which have occupied Alexander Swoboda in the course of a long and productive 
career.  But if nothing else, another look at the data will help the participants in this 
debate to refine their priors.            
 
2.  Another Look at the Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes 
  In this section I take another look at the evolution of practice with respect to 
exchange rate regimes, using two popular de facto classifications.  The first one is 
produced by the staff at the International Monetary Fund.  As described by Bubula and 
Otker-Robe (2002), this classification combines market exchange rates and other 
quantitative information with assessments of the nature of the regime drawn by IMF 
economists in the course of bilateral surveillance.  Its advantage is that it is independently 
constructed; the author cannot be accused of having coded country regimes to his liking.  
This series has now been updated through 2006.  Its disadvantage is that, based as it is in    3
part on input from the IMF’s country economists, this series is not easily extended.  The 
second classification is that of Reinhart and Roff (2004), who provide a detailed 
description of their methods.  This classification has been updated by the author in 
collaboration with Raul Razo Garcia.
3  Somewhat arbitrarily, most of the analysis here is 
conducted using the Bubula and Otker-Robe calculation.
4  Statements below refer to this 
classification except where noted to the contrary. 
  Table 1 documents the decline in intermediate regimes since 1990.  For the full 
sample of countries, the share of intermediate regimes (fixed pegs to a single currency, 
fixed pegs to a basket, currencies pegged within horizontal bands, forward looking 
crawling pegs, forward looking crawling bands, backward looking crawling pegs, 
backward looking crawling bands and other lightly managed floats) falls from about 70 
per cent in 1990 to about 45 percent in 2004.  The evacuees move to hard pegs and floats 
in roughly equal proportions.   
Beneath these regularities are contrasts between the advanced countries, emerging 
markets, and developing countries.
5  Among the advanced countries, intermediate 
regimes have essentially disappeared.  (The one country still classified as operating a soft 
peg is Denmark.)  This supports the bipolar view for the countries for which it was first 
                                                 
3 There exist still further alternatives, notably those of Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003), Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2003, 2007) and Shambaugh (2004). 
4 Comparisons suggest that the analysis undertaken here is not particularly sensitive to the measure of de 
facto exchange rate regime used.  This is what we found in Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006).  Where it 
is sensitive is with respect to the choice between measures of de facto and de jure regimes.  And the 
arguments above apply to de facto regimes.  The IMF has long published a series for countries’ official 
(self-announced) exchange rate regimes.  Alesina and Wagner (2003) provide an analysis of why de jure 
and de facto regimes might differ. 
5 The definition of advanced countries coincides with the definition of industrial countries in International 
Financial Statistics.  Following Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002), emerging markets are defined as the 
countries included in the Emerging Market Bond Index Plus (EMBI+), the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International Index (MSCI), Singapore, Sri Lanka and Hong Kong SAR.  Taiwan is excluded from the 
sample of emerging countries to make the results comparable to Bubula and Otker-Robe (2002).  The 
resulting sample consists of 24 advanced countries, 32 emerging market countries and 126 developing 
countries.   4
developed.  Within this subgroup, the dominant movement has been toward hard pegs, 
reflecting monetary unification in Europe. 
  Although emerging markets have also seen a decline in the prevalence of 
intermediate arrangements, these regimes still account for more than a third of the 
relevant subsample (41 per cent in 2006, down from 77 per cent in 1990).  Here the 
majority of the evacuees have moved to floats rather than fixes, reflecting the absence of 
EMU-like arrangements in other parts of the world.
6  But it is apparent that the move 
away from intermediate regimes among these countries has slowed and even reversed in 
recent years.  The same pattern is evident in Table 2 for the Reinhart-Rogoff 
classification.
7  There is a secular trend away from intermediate regimes, albeit one that 
has slowed and even reversed in recent years.
8 
The prevalence of intermediate regimes has again declined among developing 
countries.  Where these regimes accounted for two thirds of the developing country 
subsample in 1990 (Table 1), they account for a bit more than half today (55 per cent of 
the total in 2006, down from 64 per cent in 1990).  As with emerging markets, the 
majority of those abandoning the middle have moved to floats rather than hard pegs.  
How will the constellation of regimes look in 20 years if present trends continue?  
This question can be answered by using a simple Markov chain model, as in Masson 
                                                 
6 Note that BOR’s floats include managed floats but not “tightly managed floats,” which are classified as 
intermediate regimes, consistent with the idea that there really has been an increase in flexibility. 
7 The tabulations here differ very slightly from those in Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) because new 
data became available in some cases for earlier years (on, inter alia, black and parallel exchange rates).  In 
other cases, countries are classified as operating de facto pegs and de facto crawling pegs using five year 
windows, so the updating can in a few instances have implications for prior years. 
8 For what it is worth, the emerging markets classified as having moved to intermediate regimes using the 
Reinhart-Rogoff procedures strictly are Nigeria in 2004 (managed exchange rate to de facto band), 
Malaysia (preannounced peg to de facto crawling peg), Philippines(managed to de facto crawling band) and 
Thailand (freely floating to de facto crawling band) in 2005, and Argentina (managed to de facto crawling 
band) in 2007.   5
(2001) and Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006), to estimate the probability of regime 
transitions.  This assumes that the past is a guide to the future and that the probability of 
being in a regime in the next period depends only on the current regime.
9  For the sample 
as a whole (Bubula and Otker-Robe classification), the most persistent state is a hard peg, 
followed by the intermediate and, last, floating regimes (Table 3).  There is no absorbing 
state and hence no tendency for countries to converge to a single regime or subset of 
regimes.  The last line of the table shows the distribution of regimes if current trends 
continue for another 20 years.  This suggests that in two decades 30 per cent of countries 
will have pegs, 30 per cent will have floats, and 40 per cent will have intermediate 
arrangements.  Compared to the current constellation, the share of intermediate regimes 
will have declined further, but only modestly.  
The picture looks different when calculations are done separately for advanced 
countries, emerging markets, and developing economies. Among the advanced countries, 
intermediate arrangements are the least persistent while hard pegs are an absorbing state.  
This, of course, is just another way of saying that no country that joined EMU since 1999 
has left.
10  By 2025, the share of floaters is forecast to decline from 40 per cent to 30 per 
cent of the advanced-country subsample, one imagines through the adoption of the euro 
by additional countries.
11 
                                                 
9 Appendix 2 of Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia (2006) describes the derivation of these matrices.  Appendix 
3 of that paper also presents modified matrices constructed on the basis of estimates of how various 
covariates affect the likelihood of regime transitions.  Those matrices together with assumptions about the 
evolution of the covariates allow us to relax the assumption that transition probabilities are independent of 
country characteristics, and they allow us to apply alternative assumptions about how the key 
characteristics evolve over time. 
10 Something that the author has argued will most likely remain the case (Eichengreen 2007). 
11 Not too much should perhaps be made of this point, which is a function of the fact that a growing number 
of European countries adopted the euro starting in 1999.  Implicit here is the question of whether this 
tendency for countries to gravitate toward the Euro area could shift into reverse in the future.   6
Among emerging markets and developing countries, in contrast, hard pegs are the 
most persistent regime, followed by intermediate arrangements and then floats; note that 
this is a different pattern than for the advanced countries.
12  Here there is not strong 
support for the bipolar view.  The Markov chain analysis suggests that the share of 
emerging markets and developing with floating rates will actually be lower in 2025 than 
today, reversing the trend in recent decades.  This reflects the fact that intermediate 
arrangements are more persistent than flexible regimes in this subsample.  They may be 
adopted infrequently, but once adopted they persist.  Thus, this analysis does not suggest 
that intermediate regimes will disappear anytime soon outside the OECD.   
At the same time, the contrast between the advanced, emerging and developing 
countries suggests that there is a tendency to move away from intermediate regimes in the 
course of economic and financial (and political?) development.  To the extent that this is 
true, one can imagine that the phenomenon of the hollow middle will eventually spread 
from the now-advanced countries to the rest of the world.  One interpretation is that 
economic development, in practice, is associated with financial liberalization and the 
removal of capital controls, which heighten the fragility of intermediate regimes and 
prompt movement to the poles.  This suggests that if developing countries follow their 
advanced-country counterparts in pursuing financial and capital account liberalization, 
they will also follow them in abandoning intermediate regimes.  Compared to other 
developing countries, emerging markets both have more open capital accounts and a 
greater tendency to abandon intermediate regimes (relative openness to foreign 
investment being how the emerging-markets category is defined), consistent with this 
view.  
                                                 
12 This difference is reinforced by developments in the last couple of years (see footnote 8 above).   7
Not everyone will agree that the further relaxation of capital controls is inevitable 
or even probable.  Financial globalization has been reversed before in response to 
economic and political turbulence.  Since renewed turbulence cannot be ruled out, neither 
can reversals.  That said, many observers will agree that financial development, as it 
proceeds, shifts the balance of costs and benefits between capital account restrictions and 
capital account liberalization, in part by creating new avenues for evading controls 
(thereby rendering their effective operation more costly) while dampening at least 
partially the volatility against which controls are intended to protect.  In this view, there 
is little question that developing countries will eventually follow the developed world in 
the direction of more openness to capital flows, although there remains the question of 
how quickly. 
Another interpretation is that the advanced countries have been faster to abandon 
soft pegs because they have been faster to develop alternatives.  Europe’s alternative is 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).  One emerging market (Slovenia) is now a 
member of EMU and another (Slovakia) is about to join.  There are monetary unions in 
the developing world, notably in the East Caribbean and West Africa.
13  That said, most 
developing countries do not have an appealing monetary-union option to lure them away 
from intermediate regimes, although one day, perhaps, with further economic, financial 
and political development, they will. 
But another alternative to a pegged exchange rate as an anchor for monetary 
policy is inflation targeting.  A number of advanced countries and emerging markets have 
been able to move away from soft pegs by installing this alternative approach to the 
formulation and conduct of monetary policy that ensures not just price stability but also a 
                                                 
13 See e.g. van Beek et al. (2000) and Masson and Patillo (2004).   8
reasonably well behaved exchange rate as well.  This argument is given further 
development below. 
 
3.  Determinants of Exchange Rate Regime Choice 
  This section inquires into the determinants of exchange rate regime choice.  The 
point of departure for this analysis is the theory of optimum currency areas, which points 
to country size, openness and the asymmetry of shocks, among other variables, as 
shaping the choice between pegging and floating and – in the present context – between 
hard pegs, intermediate regimes, and floats.  It follows a previous attempt by Bayoumi 
and Eichengreen (1997) to bring that theory to the data.  To explore the availability of 
alternatives to soft pegs, it follows Eichengreen and Taylor (2004) by extending this 
framework to incorporate the prerequisites for inflation targeting. 
  The focus is on the variability of the exchange rate between a pair of countries (as 
implicit in much of the optimum-currency-area literature).  The exchange rate 
arrangement is measured by the volatility of the nominal bilateral rate over (centered) 
five-year periods.
14  The results of analyzing real rates are very similar, since price levels 
display inertia and most of the variability in real rates over periods of five years or less 
derives from the variability of nominal rates.  In focusing on actual exchange rate 
variability as a measure of the regime, the analysis parallels Ghosh, Gulde and Wolff 
                                                 
14 Centering becomes important when a measure of inflation targeting is added below, since this measure is 
year as well as country specific.  But the results are robust to different ways of calculating period averages.  
Thus, I have estimated the same basic equations, as in columns 1-3, 5-7 and 10-12 of Table 4, with all the 
same conclusions.  There is also the fact that for a number of year/country-pair observations bilateral 
exchange rate variability is zero.  The obvious solution to this problem is estimating by Tobit.  Again, 
doing so makes for no substantial difference in results.   9
(2003).  Insofar as actual variability is the most important single consideration in most de 
facto regime classifications, it is consistent with the analysis in Section 2 above. 
  The basic specification relates the variability of the exchange rate to two measures 
of asymmetric shocks: the difference or asymmetry of output shocks (measured as the 
standard deviation of the difference in the change in log-GDP between the two countries), 
and the similarity or dissimilarity of export structures (as measured by the sum of the 
absolute differences in the shares of agriculture, mineral and manufacturing trade in total 
merchandise trade).  In addition I consider the importance of bilateral trade linkages 
(measured as exports to the partner country, scaled by GDP, and averaged over the two 
countries) and the transactions costs associated with having a relatively variable 
exchange rate (which are assumed to decline with country size, measured here by the log 
of the product of real GDP of the two countries, in dollars).
15   
  There is close conformance between the predictions of the theory and the results 
for the full sample (column 1 of Table 4).  Countries with more dissimilar output 
movements have more variable bilateral rates.  Countries whose export structures are 
more dissimilar have more variable bilateral rates.  Larger economies have more variable 
rates.  Countries that trade more with one another, on the other hand, have less variable 
                                                 
15 Note that the number of countries included is now smaller because information on some of these 
correlates is lacking (year 2006 is omitted for the same reason).  The country sample is in the appendix.  At 
the same time the number of observations is greater, owing to the focus on bilateral relationships.  Data are 
from the International Monetary Fund’s Direction of Trade and International Financial Statistics, Penn 
World Tables, Statistics Canada’s World Trade Analyzer, the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, 
and the OECD’s Main Economic Indicators.  Given the focus on bilateral relationships, it is worth 
addressing the question of whether the observations are independent of one another, as required for 
classical statistical inference.  While it is true that changes in bilateral rates are not independent (the change 
between the dollar and euro and between the euro and yen, for example), the standard deviations of these 
rates – which is what are considered here – are still independent, insofar as covariances differ across 
country pairs.   10
bilateral rates.
16   These effects all carry over when the sample is split between advanced 
and emerging-market countries.  All of them continue to hold when the sample is split 
between the periods before and after the Asia-Russia-LTCM crisis (compare Tables 5 and 
6).
17 
  The model can be stress tested by adding additional potential determinants of de 
facto exchange rate arrangements. Countries with better developed financial markets (as 
measured by the average across the two countries in the M2/GNP ratio) enjoy more stable 
exchange rates. Where money growth rates diverge across countries, bilateral rates are 
more variable. Importantly, when these additional determinants are added, none of the 
central variables in column 1 is altered, in terms of sign or significance. 
An additional variable of particular interest is a measure of capital account 
openness. The results here are surprising, in that pairs of countries with relatively open 
capital account regimes appear to have less variable exchange rates, other things equal. 
This is contrary to the notion that capital mobility compels movement toward greater 
flexibility.  But capital account openness is not always significant at conventional 
confidence levels. It also varies across subsamples: it is negative for advanced countries 
but mostly positive for emerging markets.
18 For the advanced countries, capital account 
openness may be picking up aspects of financial development not fully captured by the 
other independent variables but conducive to financial and currency stability. It may also 
be picking up omitted political determinants of exchange rate variability, including the 
institutions of the European Union.  In the 1980s these mandated the removal of capital 
                                                 
16 These effects are statistically significant at standard confidence levels. 
17 That crisis having been a potential watershed in exchange rate arrangements. 
18 Similar findings are reported in Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997), where the coefficient on this variable 
is shown to vary across subperiods.   11
controls as part of the single market program while at the same time providing the EMS 
as a currency stabilization device; at the end of the 1990s they combined open capital 
markets with the euro – options that were not available to emerging economies. For the 
latter, there is more evidence of the tradeoff between capital account openness and 
exchange rate stability predicted by the bipolar view. 
Another contrast arises is when the variability of the bilateral exchange rate 
against the dollar is included to measure the global (or regional) exchange rate regime. 
For the period 1983-97 there is evidence that pegging to the dollar was an effective way 
for countries to peg to one another. (To put it another way, it appears that limiting the 
variability of dollar exchange rates was an effective way of limiting the variability of 
bilateral rates among third countries.) This effect is more strongly evident among 
emerging markets than advanced countries. This will not surprise those aware of the 
historical tendency for Asian countries, in particular, to stabilize intra-regional exchange 
rates by the use of dollar pegs. After 1997 the results for emerging markets are basically 
unchanged (long live de facto dollar pegging). But the coefficient for the advanced 
countries switches sign: for this subsample, greater stability vis-à-vis one another now is 
associated with less stability vis-à-vis the dollar. This is the monetary-union effect: EMU 
member states have effectively eliminated exchange rate variability among themselves 
while at the same time, as a result of the greater size and relatively lesser openness to the 
outside world of their union, learning to tolerate larger dollar fluctuations.  
 
 
   12
4.  Inflation Targeting as an Alternative to Exchange Rate Targeting 
One of the appeals of pegged exchange rates is thus that they provide an anchor 
and practical guide for monetary policy.  Their corresponding limitation is that the anchor 
may not be well suited to the structure of the economy or the shocks to which it is 
subjected.  Small countries are essentially forced to import the monetary policy stance of 
the larger country or countries to which they peg.  Inflation targeting has emerged in 
recent years as an increasingly popular alternative.  A stable price level (or a low rate of 
inflation) becomes the anchor for monetary policy.  To implement this framework the 
central bank must be granted the independence and clear mandate to credibly commit to 
low inflation.  It then issues an inflation forecast, explains how its policy settings map 
into the specified target, and provides an explanation for instances where the target is 
missed.
19  These steps should help to anchor market expectations and provide a 
mechanism for political accountability.  Thus, in addition to independence and a mandate 
for price stability, transparency is required for the credibility of this regime.
20 
It is sometimes said that floating is not a monetary policy strategy; rather, it is the 
absence of a strategy.  Thus, by providing a substitute strategy, inflation targeting should 
reduce the pressure to target the exchange rate.  This suggests a positive relationship 
between inflation targeting and exchange rate variability as countries reduce their 
                                                 
19 Formally, inflation targeting can be defined as a monetary policy operating strategy with four elements: 
an institutionalized commitment to price stability as the primary goal of monetary policy; mechanisms 
rendering the central bank accountable for attaining its monetary policy goals; the public announcement of 
targets for inflation; and a policy of communicating to the public and the markets the rationale for the 
decisions taken by the central bank. Institutionalizing the commitment to price stability lends credibility to 
that objective and gives the central bank the independence needed to pursue it. Mechanisms for 
accountability make this pursuit politically acceptable and impose costs on central banks that are 
incompetent or behave opportunistically. Announcing a target for inflation and articulating the basis for the 
central bank’s decisions allows these mechanisms to operate. 
20 As credibility is gained, it becomes possible for the central bank to deviate from the inflation target 
temporarily as needed to damp short-run fluctuations in output and employment without undermining belief 
in its commitment to price stability.  This then provides more policy flexibility than a simple exchange rate 
peg.  Hence “flexible inflation targeting.”   13
reliance on pegs for the nominal-anchor function.  Alternatively, one might argue that, in 
developing countries in particular, where exchange-rate-centered monetary policy 
strategies are likely to be fragile and lack credibility, adopting a more robust and credible 
alternative like inflation targeting may in fact reduce exchange rate volatility.  Insofar as 
inflation targeting provides a credible anchor for expectations, investors have less reason 
to believe that current inflation is a leading indicator of future inflation.  As expectations 
become regressive rather than extrapolative, speculation becomes stabilizing.  Exchange 
rates should then settle down.  
The fourth and fifth equations in Table 4—and the corresponding specifications 
for the country and period subsamples—add a dummy variable that equals unity when at 
least one of the central banks in a country pair is classified as an inflation targeter.  
Because inflation outcomes are likely to be affected by the behavior of the exchange 
rate—to put it another way, because countries do not opt for inflation targeting at 
random—I instrument inflation targeting using a measure of transparency (taken from 
Transparency International.)  Policy transparency is an important dimension of a 
successful inflation targeting strategy, as noted above: it is important both for managing 
expectations and providing for political accountability.  But not all countries are equally 
capable of implementing policy transparency; where transparency is integral to the 
functioning of social, economic and political institutions, an inflation targeting regime is 
more likely to be feasible.  Such is the rationale for using transparency as an instrument 
for inflation targeting.  For completeness, I report the results estimated both with and 
without the instrument.   14
The contrast between advanced countries and emerging markets is striking.  In 
Table 4, inflation targeting enters with a negative coefficient for the emerging markets, as 
if its stabilizing effect on expectations also stabilizes the exchange rate, although the 
coefficient loses its statistical significance when instrumental variables are used.  That 
negative effect is driven by post-1997 experience (compare Tables 5 and 6).  In Table 6, 
which focuses on the 1998-2005 period, the negative coefficient on the inflation targeting 
dummy is statistically significant at standard confidence levels even when instrumented.  
It is of course in the post-1997 period when most developing-country experience with 
inflation targeting is concentrated.  That the coefficients for this subsample are therefore 
better defined makes sense. 
 
5.  Conclusion 
The advanced countries have already abandoned the unstable middle.  The results 
here suggest that growing popularity of inflation targeting may allow a growing number 
of emerging markets to follow them without exposing the converts to high levels of 
exchange rate volatility.   15
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Table 1.  Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes: Bubula/Otker-Robe Classification 
(percentage of members in each category) 
   Shares 
   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
All Countries                                                    
Hard Pegs¹  16.88  17.31  20.45  17.32  17.78  18.23  18.23  20.33  20.33  25.82  26.37  26.92  26.92  26.92  26.92  26.92  26.92 
Soft Pegs²  67.53  64.74  55.68  56.98  55.00  56.91  56.91  51.10  46.70  39.56  40.11  37.91  38.46  37.91  39.56  43.96  45.60 
Floating³  15.58  17.95  23.86  25.70  27.22  24.86  24.86  28.57  32.97  34.62  33.52  35.16  34.62  35.16  33.52  29.12  27.47 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Members  154  156  176  179  180  181  181  182  182  182  182  182  182  182  182  182  182 
                                                     
Advanced                                                    
Hard Pegs¹  4.35  4.35  8.33  8.33  8.33  8.33  8.33  8.33  8.33  50.00  50.00  54.17  54.17  54.17  54.17  54.17  54.17 
Soft Pegs²  69.57  69.57  45.83  50.00  50.00  50.00  58.33  54.17  54.17  12.50  12.50  4.17  4.17  4.17  4.17  4.17  4.17 
Floating³  26.09  26.09  45.83  41.67  41.67  41.67  33.33  37.50  37.50  37.50  37.50  41.67  41.67  41.67  41.67  41.67  41.67 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Members  23  23  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24  24 
                                                     
Emerging Markets                                                 
Hard Pegs¹  6.67  10.00  9.68  9.38  9.38  9.38  9.38  12.50  12.50  12.50  15.63  12.50  12.50  12.50  12.50  12.50  12.50 
Soft Pegs²  76.67  66.67  64.52  75.00  68.75  81.25  78.13  56.25  53.13  40.63  37.50  34.38  34.38  34.38  34.38  40.63  40.63 
Floating³  16.67  23.33  25.81  15.63  21.88  9.38  12.50  31.25  34.38  46.88  46.88  53.13  53.13  53.13  53.13  46.88  46.88 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Members  30  30  31  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32 
                                                     
Other Developing                                                 
Hard Pegs¹  22.77  22.33  25.62  21.14  21.77  22.40  22.40  24.60  24.60  24.60  24.60  25.40  25.40  25.40  25.40  25.40  25.40 
Soft Pegs²  64.36  63.11  55.37  53.66  52.42  52.00  51.20  49.21  43.65  44.44  46.03  45.24  46.03  45.24  47.62  52.38  54.76 
Floating³  12.87  14.56  19.01  25.20  25.81  25.60  26.40  26.19  31.75  30.95  29.37  29.37  28.57  29.37  26.98  22.22  19.84 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Members  101  103  121  123  124  125  125  126  126  126  126  126  126  126  126  126  126 
Notes:                                                     
¹ Includes arrangements with another currency as legal tender, currency union and currency board and monetary union/monetary association.           
² Includes conventional fixed peg to a single currency, conventional fixed peg to a basket, pegged within horizontal bands, forward-looking crawling peg, forward-looking crawling band, backward-
looking crawling peg, backward-looking crawling band and other tightly managed floating.   
³ Includes managed floating with no predetermined path for the exchange rate and independently floating.                        18
Table 2.  Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes: Reinhart Rogoff Classification    
(percentage of members in each category)    
Shares 
   1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007 
ALL 
COUNTRIES                                                       
Hard Pegs¹  22.31  20.77  20.46  20.00  21.32  22.14  22.63  23.91  23.40  31.92  31.92  33.33  33.33  33.57  33.57  32.86  32.86  33.57 
Soft Pegs²  46.28  46.92  45.46  48.89  50.74  54.29  56.20  51.45  48.94  40.43  39.72  37.59  34.04  36.43  37.14  40.00  38.57  38.57 
Floating³  15.70  10.77  10.61  10.37  8.09  10.00  13.14  13.77  17.73  20.57  23.40  24.82  28.37  27.14  27.86  26.43  27.86  26.43 
Freely Falling  15.70  21.54  23.49  20.74  19.85  13.57  8.03  10.87  9.93  7.09  4.96  4.26  4.26  2.86  1.43  0.71  0.71  1.43 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Members  121  130  132  135  136  140  137  138  141  141  141  141  141  140  140  140  140  140 
                                                        
ADVANCED                                                       
Hard Pegs¹  4.35  4.35  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  47.83  47.83  52.17  52.17  52.17  52.17  52.17  52.17  52.17 
Soft Pegs²  73.91  73.91  56.52  65.22  65.22  65.22  65.22  65.22  65.22  21.74  17.39  13.04  8.70  8.70  13.04  13.04  13.04  13.04 
Floating³  21.74  21.74  34.78  34.78  34.78  34.78  34.78  34.78  34.78  30.44  34.78  34.78  39.13  39.13  34.78  34.78  34.78  34.78 
Freely Falling  0.00  0.00  8.70  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Members  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23  23 
                                                        
EMERGING 
MARKETS                                                       
Hard Pegs¹  10.00  10.00  9.68  10.00  10.00  9.38  9.38  12.50  15.63  15.63  18.75  18.75  15.63  15.63  15.63  12.50  12.50  12.50 
Soft Pegs²  60.00  60.00  61.29  70.00  73.33  68.75  71.88  50.00  50.00  43.75  40.63  34.38  34.38  37.50  40.63  46.88  46.88  50.00 
Floating³  10.00  6.67  0.00  0.00  0.00  3.13  9.38  21.88  25.00  37.50  40.63  40.63  40.63  46.88  43.75  40.63  40.63  37.50 
Freely Falling  20.00  23.33  29.03  20.00  16.67  18.75  9.38  15.63  9.38  3.13  0.00  6.25  9.38  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Members  30  30  31  30  30  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32 
                                                        
OTHER 
DEVELOPING                                                       
Hard Pegs¹  33.82  29.87  30.77  29.27  31.33  32.94  33.74  34.52  32.56  33.72  32.56  33.72  34.88  35.29  35.29  35.29  35.29  36.47 
Soft Pegs²  30.88  33.77  35.90  36.59  38.55  45.88  46.99  47.62  44.19  44.19  45.35  45.35  40.70  43.53  42.35  44.71  42.35  41.18 
Floating³  16.18  9.09  7.69  7.32  3.61  5.88  8.43  5.95  10.47  11.63  13.95  16.28  20.93  16.47  20.00  18.82  21.18  20.00 
Freely Falling  19.12  27.27  25.64  26.83  26.51  15.29  10.84  11.91  12.79  10.47  8.14  4.65  3.49  4.71  2.35  1.18  1.18  2.35 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
Members  68  77  78  82  83  85  83  84  86  86  86  86  86  85  85  85  85  85 
Source: Author's estimates using Reinhart and Rogoff's exchange rate classification 
1/ Includes arrangements with no separate legal tender, preannounced peg or currency boards, and preannounced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% 
2/ Includes de facto pegs, de facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2%, preannounced crawling band that is wider than or equal to +/-2%, de facto crawling band that is narrower than or 
equal to +/-5%, moving band that is narrower than or equal to +/-2% (i.e., allows for both appreciation and depreciation over time), preannounced crawling peg, preannounced crawling band that is narrower 
than or equal to +/-2%, and de facto crawling peg.  
3/ Includes managed floating and freely floating arrangements   19
 
             
              
   Table 3.  Transition probability from period t to period t+1 
Regime in Period t  Hard Peg  Intermediate  Floating  Total Observations 
              
All Countries             
Hard Peg  98.92  0.31  0.77  648 
Intermediate  1.08  91.74  7.18  1392 
Floating  0.37  10.12  89.51  820 
Total           2860 
              
Forecast 2025  31.47  38.97  29.56    
              
Advanced Countries          
Hard Peg  100.00  0.00  0.00  105 
Intermediate  8.46  86.15  5.38  130 
Floating  0.00  2.04  97.96  147 
Total           382 
              
Forecast 2025  62.35  5.11  32.55    
              
Emerging Market Countries          
Hard Peg  98.25  0.00  1.75  57 
Intermediate  0.00  88.45  11.55  277 
Floating  1.73  12.14  86.13  173 
Total           507 
              
Forecast 2025  20.38  41.56  38.14    
              
Other Developing Countries          
Hard Peg  98.77  0.41  0.82  486 
Intermediate  0.41  93.40  6.19  985 
Floating  0.00  11.80  88.20  500 
Total           1971 
              
Forecast 2025  23.60  49.35  27.05    
   20
 
Table 4: Determinants of the Volatility of the Bilateral Exchange Rate: 1983-2005 
   All Countries  Advanced
a  Emerging Markets
b 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]
d  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]
d  [11]  [12]  [13]  [14]  [15]
d 
                                               
Variability of output (SD(lnYi-
lnYj))  2.3077  1.1822  0.2723  0.2459  -0.0238  0.1227  -0.0372  -0.0326  -0.0208  0.0275  3.0342  1.5940  0.2719  0.2509  0.3122 
   0.0493  0.0629  0.0216  0.0219  0.0438  0.0295  0.0568  0.0567  0.0567  0.0533  0.0931  0.1013  0.0316  0.0320  0.0641 
Dissimilarity of exports  0.0042  0.0019  0.0007  0.0007  0.0020  0.0021  0.0013  0.0013  0.0013  0.0018  0.0029  0.0022  0.0006  0.0007  0.0009 
   0.0002  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0004  0.0004  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002 
Trade ratio  -0.0174  -0.0080  0.0017  0.0010  -0.0052  -0.0085  -0.0039  -0.0043  -0.0044  -0.0050  -0.0154  0.0123  -0.0058  -0.0062  -0.0037 
   0.0014  0.0021  0.0007  0.0007  0.0010  0.0005  0.0008  0.0008  0.0008  0.0008  0.0027  0.0065  0.0020  0.0020  0.0018 
Size of economy  0.0057  0.0053  0.0000  0.0008  0.0084  0.0160  0.0040  0.0032  0.0040  0.0098  0.0288  0.0106  -0.0051  -0.0030  0.0014 
   0.0019  0.0026  0.0009  0.0009  0.0014  0.0007  0.0016  0.0017  0.0017  0.0022  0.0047  0.0048  0.0015  0.0016  0.0028 
Capital account openess
c 
   -0.0073  -0.0005  -0.0002  -0.0058     -0.0057  -0.0062  -0.0070  -0.0062     -0.0024  0.0055  0.0058  0.0038 
      0.0009  0.0003  0.0003  0.0005     0.0009  0.0009  0.0010  0.0017     0.0018  0.0006  0.0006  0.0007 
Money ratio     -0.1157  -0.0190  -0.0176  0.0026     0.0119  0.0139  0.0130  0.0243     -0.1565  -0.0098  -0.0058  -0.0041 
      0.0077  0.0027  0.0027  0.0038     0.0048  0.0049  0.0049  0.0048     0.0153  0.0047  0.0048  0.0057 
Openness     -0.0006  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001     -0.0005  -0.0004  -0.0004  0.0000     -0.0007  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
      0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000     0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001     0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Relative growth of money     0.3812  0.0437  0.0428  -0.0024     0.0042  0.0048  0.0051  0.0021     0.3672  0.0445  0.0437  -0.0054 
      0.0050  0.0020  0.0020  0.0088     0.0120  0.0119  0.0119  0.0119     0.0070  0.0025  0.0025  0.0104 
Variability of U.S. dollar 
exchange rate        1.6766  1.6763  1.5374        -0.1110  -0.1166  -0.5142        1.6648  1.6640  1.6131 
         0.0054  0.0054  0.0128        0.0438  0.0438  0.0534        0.0069  0.0069  0.0131 
Inflation Targeting           -0.0122  -0.1225           0.0075  0.0347           -0.0118  -0.0021 
            0.0017  0.0079           0.0030  0.0080           0.0028  0.0090 
Constant  -0.0049  0.1629  -0.0436  -0.0506  -0.0429  -0.1382  0.0911  0.1115  0.1044  0.0097  -0.2276  0.1167  0.0058  -0.0182  -0.0589 
   0.0230  0.0316  0.0108  0.0108  0.0179  0.0092  0.0217  0.0231  0.0232  0.0372  0.0542  0.0596  0.0183  0.0192  0.0307 
Observations  24352  12600  12600  12600  6375  4164  1094  1094  1094  734  8064  6147  6147  6147  2727 
R
2  0.12  0.45  0.94  0.94  0.75  0.24  0.30  0.30  0.30  0.45  0.13  0.43  0.95  0.95  0.88 
aAdvanced countries versus 
advanced countries                                               
b Emerging markets versus 
emerging markets                                              
c Brune's capital account openness index excluding exchange rate structure.                                   
d Estimated by IV.                                              
Notes: Standard errors are reported below the coeffcients. The model controlling for inflation targeting is estimated by IV. In the IV model, inflation targeting was instrumented using the index of 
corruption perceptions and the exogenous variables.    21
 
Table 5: Determinants of Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility, 1983-1997 
   All Countries  Advanced
a  Emerging Markets
b 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]
d  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]
d  [11]  [12]  [13]  [14]  [15]
d 
                                               
Variability of output (SD(lnYi-lnYj))  2.5722  1.5917  0.2315  0.2318  -0.1014  0.2119  -0.0397  -0.0864  -0.0814  0.1351  3.0765  1.8629  0.2098  0.2124  0.2659 
   0.0689  0.1009  0.0293  0.0294  0.1020  0.0427  0.1669  0.1539  0.1545  0.2422  0.1279  0.1430  0.0425  0.0425  0.1572 
Dissimilarity of exports  0.0051  0.0024  0.0003  0.0002  0.0013  0.0017  0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0011  0.0039  0.0031  0.0006  0.0005  0.0005 
   0.0003  0.0004  0.0001  0.0001  0.0003  0.0001  0.0003  0.0002  0.0002  0.0004  0.0006  0.0006  0.0002  0.0002  0.0004 
Trade ratio  -0.0239  -0.0110  0.0034  0.0034  -0.0002  -0.0094  -0.0070  -0.0057  -0.0057  -0.0081  -0.0192  0.0400  -0.0368  -0.0368  -0.0744 
   0.0022  0.0040  0.0012  0.0012  0.0019  0.0007  0.0013  0.0012  0.0012  0.0012  0.0042  0.0239  0.0070  0.0070  0.0112 
Size of economy  0.0195  -0.0032  0.0051  0.0051  0.0065  0.0147  0.0009  0.0078  0.0082  0.0361  0.0751  -0.0007  -0.0049  -0.0053  -0.0284 
   0.0027  0.0049  0.0014  0.0014  0.0036  0.0009  0.0033  0.0031  0.0032  0.0107  0.0070  0.0085  0.0025  0.0025  0.0076 
Capital account openness
c 
   -0.0020  0.0046  0.0046  0.0017     -0.0031  0.0019  0.0017  0.0271     0.0078  0.0082  0.0082  0.0022 
      0.0017  0.0005  0.0005  0.0011     0.0012  0.0013  0.0013  0.0078     0.0033  0.0010  0.0010  0.0026 
Money ratio     -0.1676  -0.0451  -0.0451  -0.0535     -0.0107  -0.0428  -0.0434  0.0074     -0.1832  -0.0154  -0.0158  -0.0511 
      0.0146  0.0042  0.0042  0.0080     0.0096  0.0096  0.0097  0.0172     0.0289  0.0085  0.0085  0.0158 
Openness     -0.0020  0.0002  0.0002  -0.0008     -0.0007  -0.0011  -0.0011  -0.0009     -0.0024  0.0000  0.0000  -0.0011 
      0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001     0.0003  0.0003  0.0003  0.0006     0.0003  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002 
Relative growth of money     0.3737  0.0365  0.0365  0.0157     0.0070  -0.0058  -0.0049  0.0541     0.3582  0.0422  0.0422  0.0024 
      0.0062  0.0021  0.0021  0.0149     0.0243  0.0224  0.0226  0.0630     0.0087  0.0030  0.0030  0.0208 
Variability of U.S. dollar exchange rate        1.7195  1.7196  1.7490        0.6199  0.6262  0.6035        1.6818  1.6826  1.8059 
         0.0062  0.0062  0.0182        0.0702  0.0719  0.2984        0.0084  0.0085  0.0266 
Inflation Targeting           0.0008  -0.0282           0.0021  0.0529           0.0069  0.0265 
            0.0030  0.0093           0.0051  0.0118           0.0062  0.0124 
Constant  -0.1774  0.3245  -0.1082  -0.1082  -0.0437  -0.1134  0.1634  0.0380  0.0330  -0.6455  -0.7352  0.3045  0.0079  0.0120  0.3697 
   0.0335  0.0609  0.0175  0.0175  0.0461  0.0114  0.0482  0.0467  0.0483  0.1970  0.0814  0.1058  0.0309  0.0311  0.0949 
Observations  15723  6944  6944  6944  1039  2759  444  444  444  84  5094  3711  3711  3711  507 
R
2  0.11  0.46  0.96  0.96  0.92  0.19  0.12  0.26  0.26  0.59  0.13  0.44  0.95  0.95  0.92 
a Advanced countries versus advanced countries only                                            
b Emerging markets versus emerging markets 
only                                              
c Brune's capital account openness index excluding exchange rate structure.                                
d Estimated by IV.                     
Note: Standard errors are reported below the coefficients. The model controlling for inflation 
targeting is estimated by IV. In the IV model, inflation targeting was instrumented using the index of 
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Table 6: Determinants of Bilateral Exchange Rate Volatility, 1998-2005 
   All Countries  Advanced
a  Emerging Markets
b 
Variables  [1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5]
d  [6]  [7]  [8]  [9]  [10]
d  [11]  [12]  [13]  [14]  [15]
d 
                                               
Variability of output (SD(lnYi-lnYj))  1.2351  1.0772  0.4268  0.3720  0.0412  0.0251  -0.0197  0.0037  0.0164  0.0268  2.0793  2.0628  0.5230  0.4344  0.4556 
   0.0530  0.0612  0.0327  0.0330  0.0483  0.0381  0.0574  0.0546  0.0537  0.0546  0.1198  0.1250  0.0527  0.0538  0.0684 
Dissimilarity of exports  0.0025  0.0019  0.0014  0.0015  0.0021  0.0027  0.0022  0.0023  0.0021  0.0019  0.0014  0.0016  0.0008  0.0009  0.0009 
   0.0002  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0002  0.0003  0.0003  0.0001  0.0001  0.0002 
Trade ratio  -0.0101  -0.0043  0.0001  -0.0009  -0.0066  -0.0065  -0.0026  -0.0039  -0.0040  -0.0041  -0.0091  0.0015  -0.0026  -0.0033  -0.0030 
   0.0012  0.0016  0.0008  0.0008  0.0011  0.0006  0.0009  0.0009  0.0009  0.0009  0.0022  0.0039  0.0016  0.0016  0.0016 
Size of economy  -0.0088  -0.0053  -0.0017  -0.0003  0.0085  0.0197  0.0138  0.0081  0.0101  0.0117  -0.0172  -0.0289  -0.0046  0.0006  0.0007 
   0.0017  0.0022  0.0012  0.0012  0.0016  0.0011  0.0021  0.0021  0.0021  0.0023  0.0043  0.0045  0.0019  0.0020  0.0031 
Capital account openness
c 
   -0.0133  -0.0059  -0.0063  -0.0093     -0.0101  -0.0106  -0.0098  -0.0091     -0.0173  0.0028  0.0030  0.0026 
      0.0008  0.0004  0.0004  0.0006     0.0020  0.0019  0.0019  0.0020     0.0016  0.0007  0.0007  0.0008 
Money ratio     -0.0655  -0.0054  -0.0028  0.0126     0.0282  0.0289  0.0255  0.0227     -0.1291  -0.0035  0.0024  0.0017 
      0.0060  0.0032  0.0032  0.0043     0.0054  0.0051  0.0051  0.0053     0.0115  0.0048  0.0048  0.0057 
Openness     -0.0003  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000     -0.0001  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0000     0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
      0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000     0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001     0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000 
Relative growth of money     0.3231  0.0352  0.0309  0.0030     -0.0012  0.0013  0.0014  0.0016     0.3627  -0.0073  -0.0132  -0.0095 
      0.0144  0.0080  0.0079  0.0104     0.0129  0.0123  0.0120  0.0122     0.0250  0.0107  0.0106  0.0115 
Variability of U.S. dollar exchange rate        1.4843  1.4835  1.4604        -0.4854  -0.5061  -0.5230        1.5612  1.5630  1.5467 
         0.0123  0.0122  0.0160        0.0582  0.0573  0.0586        0.0141  0.0140  0.0150 
Inflation Targeting           -0.0199  -0.1412           0.0182  0.0331           -0.0204  -0.0122 
            0.0021  0.0483           0.0036  0.0082           0.0029  0.0092 
Constant  0.2049  0.2853  -0.0015  -0.0038  -0.0107  -0.2032  -0.0506  0.0785  0.0391  0.0070  0.3157  0.5488  0.0085  -0.0400  -0.0438 
   0.0210  0.0275  0.0147  0.0146  0.0197  0.0145  0.0316  0.0338  0.0340  0.0379  0.0491  0.0555  0.0231  0.0239  0.0330 
Observations  8629  5656  5656  5656  5336  1405  650  650  650  650  2970  2436  2436  2436  2220 
R
2  0.11  0.26  0.79  0.80  0.67  0.35  0.37  0.43  0.45  0.44  0.11  0.29  0.88  0.88  0.88 
a Advanced countries versus advanced countries only                                            
b Emerging markets versus emerging markets 
only                                              
c Brune's capital account openness index excluding exchange rate structure.                                 
d Estimated by IV                                              
Notes: Standard errors are reported below the coeffcients. The model controlling for inflation targeting is estimated by IV. In the IV model, inflation targeting was instrumented using the index of 
corruption perceptions and the exogenous variables.    23
 
Table 7       
        
List of Countries Included in the Regressions 
        
Argentina  Iceland  Philippines 
Australia  India  Poland 
Austria  Indonesia  Portugal 
Belgium  Ireland  Russian Federation 
Brazil  Israel  Singapore 
Bulgaria  Italy  South Africa 
Canada  Japan  Spain 
Chile  Jordan  Sri Lanka 
China  Korea Rep.  Sweden 
Colombia  Luxembourg  Switzerland 
Czech Republic  Malaysia  Thailand 
Denmark  Mexico  Turkey 
Ecuador  Morocco  United Kingdom 
Egypt Arab Rep.  Netherlands  United States 
Finland  New Zealand  Venezuela RB 
France  Nigeria    
Germany  Norway    
Greece  Pakistan    
Hong Kong China  Panama    
Hungary  Peru    
        